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Through the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC) study, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) continues to evaluate potential approaches for sending 
humans beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). A key aspect of these missions is the strategy that is 
employed to maintain and repair the spacecraft systems, ensuring that they continue to 
function and support the crew. Long duration missions beyond LEO present unique and 
severe maintainability challenges due to a variety of factors, including: limited to no 
opportunities for resupply, the distance from Earth, mass and volume constraints of 
spacecraft, high sensitivity of transportation element designs to variation in mass, the lack of 
abort opportunities to Earth, limited hardware heritage information, and the operation of 
human-rated systems in a radiation environment with little to no experience. The current 
approach to maintainability, as implemented on ISS, which includes a large number of 
spares pre-positioned on ISS, a larger supply sitting on Earth waiting to be flown to ISS, and 
an on demand delivery of logistics from Earth, is not feasible for future deep space human 
missions. For missions beyond LEO, significant modifications to the maintainability 
approach will be required. 
Through the EMC evaluations, several key findings related to the reliability and safety of 
the Mars spacecraft have been made. The nature of random and induced failures presents 
significant issues for deep space missions. Because spare parts cannot be flown as needed for 
Mars missions, all required spares must be flown with the mission or pre-positioned. These 
spares must cover all anticipated failure modes and provide a level of overall reliability and 
safety that is satisfactory for human missions. This will require a large amount of mass and 
volume be dedicated to storage and transport of spares for the mission. Further, there is, 
and will continue to be, a significant amount of uncertainty regarding failure rates for 
spacecraft components. This uncertainty makes it much more difficult to anticipate failures 
and will potentially require an even larger amount of spares to provide an acceptable level of 
safety. Ultimately, the approach to maintenance and repair applied to ISS, focusing on the 
supply of spare parts, may not be tenable for deep space missions. Other approaches, such as 
commonality of components, simplification of systems, and in-situ manufacturing will be 
required. 
                                                          
1 Vice President/Chief Scientist, 8455 Colesville Road Suite 1075, AIAA Member. 
2 Aerospace Engineer, Space Missions Analysis Branch, MS 462, AIAA Senior Member. 
3 Senior Researcher, Space Missions Analysis Branch, MS 462, non-AIAA Member. 
4 Graduate Research Fellow, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Building 33-409, 77 Massachusetts Ave., 
AIAA Student Member. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160011578 2019-08-29T16:29:46+00:00Z
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
2 
Nomenclature 
DSH = Deep Space Habitat 
DSV = Deep Space Vehicle 
EMAT = Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool 
EMC = Evolvable Mars Campaign 
ISM = In-Space Manufacturing 
ISS = International Space Station 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
MTBF = Mean Time Between Failure 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
PLOC = Probability of Loss of Crew 
I. Introduction 
HROUGH an investment in the Evolvable Mars Campaign (EMC)i, NASA continues to study human missions  
beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) and on to Mars in the 2030s. One of the major challenges with missions to Mars 
will be keeping the spacecraft operational for long durations away from Earth to the degree necessary to meet 
Agency safety expectations. How the spacecraft is maintained and repaired in transit and at the destination will have 
a major impact on safety and reliability. Current approaches to maintenance and repair, implemented for the 
International Space Station (ISS), will not suffice. ISS has the benefit of being in LEO, thus allowing for ease of 
access. In addition, ISS has a large number of spare components on board and a larger supply waiting on Earth to be 
launched on-demand, greatly reducing the risk of a non-repairable failure. For missions to Mars, the distance from 
Earth and duration of the mission will necessitate the need for a different maintenance strategy.  
Once the crew departs from Earth’s sphere of influence, there will be no opportunity to resupply the deep space 
vehicle (DSV). Therefore, all the spare components required to maintain a high probability of crew safety and 
mission success will have to be included with the DSV or pre-positioned. Conjunction class Mars missions (as 
envisioned in EMC) range in length from 1,000 to 1,200 days, with no quick abort path back to Earth. The duration 
drives the amount of spares required to protect against probabilistic failures over the mission. The lack of any quick 
abort paths back to Earth also dictates the need to send all critical spares along with the crew. These missions will 
have stringent mass and volume constraints due to the energy required to propel the Deep Space Vehicle (DSV) to 
Mars and back to Earth. Adding mass and volume of the spare components must be balanced with the propellant 
requirements to transit the DSV to the destination and return them to Earth. 
Given that NASA’s experience with long-duration crew spacecraft operations is limited to ISS and LEO, several 
sources of uncertainty exist in the ability to relate ISS reliability heritage information to the design and selection of 
components to be included in any potential future DSV. These uncertainties are likely to stem from a variety of 
sources including the potential use of non-ISS heritage systems or the use of ISS heritage systems that haven’t 
operated for a sufficiently long enough period of time to ascertain a statistically valid understanding of their 
expected lifetimes. This limited operational experience will have a negative effect on NASA’s understanding of 
system reliability in a number of areas including random failures, induced failures, wear out, and potential design 
and manufacturing errors. Lack of system reliability characterization is further likely to be exasperated given 
uncertainties in the deep space environment, unknown radiation effects, and the complexity of the system envisioned 
to support crew on their journey to Mars and back. 
II. Uncertainty in Random Failures 
Anyone who has ever purchased a new car has likely heard the advice to never buy a model in its first year of 
production. In fact, statistics generally show that this advice is soundii. The first model year of most vehicles have 
traditionally experienced higher rates of failure and more recall notices than do later model years. This is true 
despite the fact that the automobile companies spend large sums of time and money dedicated to testing and 
improving these vehicles in a relevant environment before they are put into production; i.e., accumulating a large 
number of test miles before they actually hit the showroom floor. 
So, why does this happen? Well, it often comes down to a critical factor called “MTBF, or “Mean Time Between 
Failures”. This parameter predicts the average time between random failures for each component in the car (or any 
other system). It is NOT a measure of lifetime of the component. If this were true, failures would be easy to address. 
Through proper testing, the time at which a component will wear out could be predicted and improvements to 
problematic parts could be made. But, the types of random failures defined by MTBF have nothing to do with 
accumulated lifetime; rather they are failures that can occur randomly at any time. However, by knowing the MTBF, 
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one should still be able to predict the frequency of failures and would be able to engineer a car that is more reliable 
from the start. 
The potential issue, however, is uncertainty in establishing a statistically valid MTBF. When new products are 
first developed, one can only make estimates for MTBF. This is done based on a number of inputs including 
component testing in a relative environment, and on how previously existing similar components (motors, valves, 
fans, etc.) have performed in similar applications. But, each new component design contributes new uncertainties 
and each new application introduces a new environment and therefore additional new uncertainties. Because 
predicted MTBFs are generally very long, the only way to reduce the uncertainty in the estimates is to run a large 
number of components for very long periods of time. That is why reliability often suffers in the first model year; 
until thousands of cars have accumulated a large number of miles, there is not enough information available to refine 
the MTBF estimates and to identify and rectify problem components. 
So, how does this impact human travel to Mars?  
The Deep Space Habitat (DSH), which is the portion of the DSV designed to house and keep the crew alive for 
the trip to and from Mars, will be one of the most complex machines ever designed. As currently envisioned, the 
habitat will close the environmental loop, recycling air and water. It will regulate the temperature of the spacecraft. 
It will provide power for all necessary functions. It will provide navigation, control, and communications. And, it 
will provide all of the other functions required to keep a crew healthy and productive for up to three years. The 
systems of the habitat will be comprised of thousands of components, many of which will be critical to the survival 
of the crew. And, just like with the car, the habitat will be subject to random failures, as defined by the MTBFs, of 
all of those components. 
If accurate values of MTBF for all of the components could be predicted with limited uncertainty, NASA could 
understand the potential failure modes of the habitat and could manifest a set of spare components that would cover 
the potential failures and provide a reasonable level of reliability over the course of the Mars mission. This has been 
the traditional approach that NASA has applied to the ISS and other human missions. 
III. EMAT Capability 
NASA performs extensive analysis to assess the reliability of spacecraft. By applying a probabilistic assessment 
methodology, designers evaluate the likelihood and impact of potential failures and prioritize spares based on those 
results. To understand the impacts of various sparing approaches and their associated spares mass for EMC 
missions, NASA has created the Exploration Maintainability Analysis Tool (EMAT). The objective for EMAT is to 
provide a capability to evaluate the feasibility of different sparing approaches and associated spares mass, and to 
estimate the contribution to mission safety and mission reliability that will come from modeled systems. EMAT 
results can be utilized to determine the contribution of the DSH to the probability of loss of crew (PLOC) based on 
the number of spares manifested on the mission. 
A. EMAT Description 
EMATiii,iv is a probabilistic simulator of spacecraft system failures and repair activities. A Monte Carlo 
environment is used to simulate stochastic component failures and repair activities in representative beyond LEO 
missions. System logic diagrams and spares availability are utilized to evaluate system and mission impacts of 
failures.  
EMAT is structured in several nested layers, each of which executes a different level of analysis. Inputs to the 
model define system components and operations, element reliability and available spares. System operations are 
defined through description of the logical relationships between the components in a specific system. A mission is 
evaluated on a day-by-day basis for a specified mission length, with system failures and repair activities simulated 
for each day. EMAT monitors two states for each system and its component - whether it is currently functional 
and/or currently operational. A system or component may be functional (i.e., not in need of repair) but not 
operational due to component failures elsewhere in the system. Monitoring these two states is necessary since 
components are less likely to fail while not operating.  
The Monte Carlo engine executes a large number of mission simulations (cases), each with independent 
stochastic failures. The tool monitors statistical convergence of simulation results in order to determine the required 
number of cases. Finally, a post-processor statistically evaluates the results from Monte Carlo cases to produce 
probabilistic results.  
The model requires several types of input: system descriptions and logic relations, reliability data, repair time, 
and mission description data. The system descriptions and logic relations define the interdependencies of the system 
components, which components are removable and replaceable, and which components are consumables with a 
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limited lifetime. The reliability data, including MTBF values, is used to simulate failures of the base components. 
The spares inventory is a running total of the spares available for the removable and replaceable components. The 
repair time is used to simulate the repairs of the components that have already failed in the mission simulation. The 
mission description data includes the mission duration, crew size, and initial states of the components. 
EMAT begins a simulation run with no manifested spares and evaluates the overall reliability of the DSH. The 
tool then assesses the probability of different failure modes and examines each possible spare that could be added, 
selecting the spare that most effectively reduces risk from a mass perspective. In this manner EMAT produces a 
curve of overall reliability versus spares mass for the mission. 
B. Deep Space Habitat Description 
A component-level definition of critical DSH systems has been developed based on input from system experts, 
International Space Station (ISS) system definition, and spacecraft modeling tools. The model is an initial 
representative baseline systems definition of a beyond LEO spacecraft. This definition of DSH systems was 
modeled in EMAT in order to conduct an analysis of maintainability. This model is intended to serve as an initial cut 
at describing what DSH systems may ultimately look like, as informed by system experts, in order to serve as a 
starting point to begin conducting sensitivity analysis and trade studies. The actual design of future systems can vary 
significantly from this description, based on mission requirements, technologies, and constraints. 
The baseline system design includes system features, such as redundancy and multiple strings, which are 
designed into the systems to improve reliability. The model also includes certain limited duration capabilities 
designed to provide emergency backup to the crew if the primary systems are off-line. 
Because the focus of EMAT analysis is on investigating trades between spares mass and mission safety and 
reliability, the model currently only includes critical systems for which spares are likely to be allocated. Certain 
systems, such as propulsion, are not currently included because, for this baseline, they are considered to be non-
repairable. Other systems are not included because they are considered non-critical, in which a system failure will 
not lead to loss of mission or loss of crew. These types of systems may be added to future iterations of the DSH 
model. The systems currently captured in the baseline system definition are: thermal control system, atmosphere 
control system, attitude and rate determination, command and data handling, communications and tracking, 
electrical power system, and water recovery and processing system. 
IV. Baseline DSH Reliability 
Figure 1 shows an example of EMAT output for the DSH systems for a human Mars mission. The results in 
Figure 1 illustrate the habitat system reliability over the life of a 1,100-day mission versus the associated mass of the 
manifested inventory of spares. As expected, improving the overall reliability of the system is initially fairly easy to 
accomplish in an efficient manner. This is achieved because as spares are added that cover high-likelihood, critical 
failures, the reliability increases fairly rapidly. But, as risk is driven out of the system through the manifesting of 
critical spares, it becomes increasingly more difficult to make further improvements. This has to do with nature of 
random failures in complex systems. Once the really likely failures (of which there are few) are protected against, 
spares are manifested to try to protect against increasingly rare events. There are simply so many potential failure 
modes, so many critical components, in such a complex machine, that the net product of all these very low 
probability failures can be very high. So, in order to drive overall reliability to higher and higher levels, one is forced 
to protect against a huge number of very unlikely failures, resulting in an ever-increasing amount of spares. With the 
desire to increase crew safety, there is a desire to increase DSH system reliability to even higher levels, resulting in 
the need to protect against multiple faults in an ever-increasing number of components.  
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While at first look, the total amount of desired mass for DSH spares does not seem inconsistent with current ISS 
heritage spares needs, implementing these results in terms of architecting a mission to Mars appear to be extremely 
challenging and potentially very expensive. The results demonstrate that, if spacecraft are designed and maintained 
in a manner that is similar to what has been done in the past, a large amount of mass and volume will need to be 
devoted to spares. Because of the high gear ratios, driven by orbital mechanics considerations, involved with 
reasonable human travel times to Mars, the resultant total launch mass and associated in-space transportation 
requirements driven by spares needs will be quite large. However, while challenging, it is still feasible that a mission 
can be designed to accommodate this magnitude of spares. 
V. Uncertainty in Component Reliability Data 
Unfortunately, as challenging as these results are, they still do not present a sufficiently complete nor accurate 
story. The results in Figure 1 assume that the system MTBFs, taken from ISS heritage data, represent a  perfect state 
of knowledge of those MTBFs – that the probability that any component will suffer one or more failures over the 
course of the mission is known precisely. This most certainly will not be the case. The DSH will almost assuredly 
not be an exact replication of the current ISS habitat module, associated nodes, and external support systems, but 
will be a new element. And, while many of the DSH systems, to some degree, will likely be similar to systems that 
have been tested and demonstrated on-board the ISS or some other potential cis-lunar facility, it is highly likely that 
there will still be a large degree of uncertainty associated with the predicted MTBF values.  
The results presented in Figure 1 capture only the aleatoric uncertainty in the DSH system. The manifested 
spares are intended to reduce the risk of failure due to uncertainty in the operation of the system itself. The 
uncertainty in the MTBF values themselves represents epistemic uncertainty – uncertainty in understanding of the 
inherent operational reliability of the system. 
This epistemic uncertainty in MTBF estimates will have a drastic effect on the potential overall reliability of the 
habitat and on the behavior of the relationship between mass and DSH system reliability as demonstrated in Figure 
1. As MTBF values vary, the likelihood of component failure and therefore the true potential reliability for the 
 
Figure 1- Baseline DSH System Reliability versus Spares Mass (No Uncertainty in MTBF) 
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habitat will vary significantly. A notional gross sensitivity of DSH system reliability to MTBF is demonstrated in 
Figure 2. In this set of results, the baseline current predicted MTBF values used to calculate the results shown in 
Figure 1, are varied for all critical components. For the red curve, each MTBF value is assumed to be cut in half, 
increasing the probability of failure. For the green curve, all MTBF values are assumed to be doubled, decreasing 
the probability of failure. The results from Figure 2 show the sensitivity of the overall reliability to MTBF.  
Relatively small decreases in MTBF (which can often vary by orders of magnitude) result in substantial changes in 
overall reliability.  
In addition, the results show a significant degree of asymmetry. Reductions in MTBF have a greater relative 
impact on overall DSH system reliability than do improvements of a similar magnitude. In order to achieve a fixed 
level of overall reliability, a set of spares has to be manifested that cover anticipated failure modes to a degree that 
provides that reliability. Improving MTBFs have limited value at that point because there are only small 
improvements in reliability that are available for each component. In addition, the cost of increasing reliability 
grows exponentially as MTBF increasesv. Conversely, as MTBFs decrease, the DSH is no longer adequately 
protected and the probability of failure for each component increases, driving down overall reliability. 
Again, the examples shown in Figure 2 are notional, derived to demonstrate the sensitivity of reliability to 
MTBF. As the MTBFs for each and every component will not vary by the same amount or even in the same 
direction, additional “real-world” information is needed to better understand the likely behavior of future habitat 
systems. In reality, when uncertainty exists in MTBF values, it is likely that the MTBF values for some components 
will be higher than initially estimated and some will be lower. The real questions are “what fraction will be higher 
and what fraction lower?” and “how much will the MTBF values vary?” The answers to these questions will 
ultimately drive the overall reliability of the DSH. 
Luckily, one of the greatest possible resources to explore uncertainty in MTBF value for human spacecraft 
already exists in the form of the ISS. As currently envisioned, many systems in the DSH will be functionally very 
similar to those that are currently operating on the ISS. This means that, to some degree, NASA will be able to take 
advantage of all of the operational experience that is being gained and will be gained in the future on ISS to 
understand and refine the reliability analysis for future DSH systems.  
 
Figure 2 – Sensitivity of DSH System Reliability to Theoretical Variability in MTBF 
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Table 1 demonstrates the operational experience that has been gained on ISS as it relates to reducing uncertainty 
in MTBF valuesvi. This table summarizes the operational time versus the initially predicted MTBF for the most vital 
(all Criticality Level 1 and Criticality Level 2 spares) ISS components on-board the habitable portion of the non-
Russian side of the ISS, the United States Operational Segment (USOS). These components roughly represent those 
that would be critical to crew survival in the DSH. This dataset will most closely represent that which will be used 
for DSH reliability analysis.   
The amount of operational 
experience varies significantly 
between components. This is 
because the range of predicted 
MTBFs varies substantially 
between individual components 
(from a low of about 2,000 hours 
to a high of 100 Million+ hours). 
Also, the amount of accumulated 
operational time varies between 
components. For certain 
components, of which there are 
multiple copies on ISS, the 
operational times of all active 
components can be summed 
together, resulting in a greater 
equivalent overall lifetime. For others, of which there are only single copies that run only periodically, the 
operational lifetimes have been quite small. 
The second column in Table 1 shows the percentage of components that have accumulated certain levels of 
operational experience through June of 2016. Approximately 25% of these components have not yet achieved a 
tenth MTBF (0.1X MTBF) of their operational experience. Another 30% have accumulated operational lifetimes 
between a tenth and half (0.1X and 0.5X) MTBF. 30% have accumulated operational lifetimes of between a half and 
one (0.5X and 1.0X) MTBF. Only 15% have lifetimes greater than 1.0X MTBF.  
Typically, in order to gain a high level of confidence that an actual MTBF is reasonably close to the predicted 
operational time, very long accumulated operational times are required. To have a confidence level of 95% in the 
MTBF value, an operational period on the order of three times the MTBF (3X) is required. To increase the 
confidence to 99%, a period approaching five times the MTBF (5X) is required. These long periods are required to 
increase confidence because the MTBF estimates are simply an average time to occurrence of an anticipated failure. 
It is the nature of random failures that sometimes failures can occur early (unlucky) and sometime they can occur 
late (lucky). Very long operational periods are required to really understand the average frequency that failures will 
occur. However, even with accumulated operational lifetimes that are significantly lower than the 3X to 5X MTBF 
described, it is possible to begin to reduce uncertainty in MTBF and to refine MTBF estimates.  
The ISS Program is diligent about tracking repair activities, evaluating failure data, and using that information to 
better understand MTBF estimates for all components. Typically, MTBF estimates will be evaluated and potentially 
updated for components that have achieved 0.5X of the initial MTBF estimate or which have experienced failures. 
The reanalysis of ISS component MTBF is performed using a Bayesian process to evaluate observed reliability. The 
methodology employed by the ISS Program is described in detail by Anderson et. alvii.  
By applying this process, the ISS Program has modified the MTBFs of approximately 55% of the Criticality 1 
(Crit. 1) and Criticality 2 (Crit. 2) components, through June 2016. The fact that MTBF values have been updated 
for a number of ISS components does NOT indicate that there is no longer any uncertainty in the MTBF estimates, 
but rather that there is enough operational experience to begin to reduce that uncertainty. 
The third column in Table 1 indicates the expected level of operational experience that would be gained, if the 
ISS were to operate through 2028. This data was derived by extrapolating the accumulated operational time for each 
component through 2028, based on the level of experience gained from initial operations through 2016. By 2028, it 
is expected that there will be a significant percentage of components that still will not have achieved the 0.5X 
MTBF threshold (approximately 30%). However, 17% of components will have operational lifetimes of between 
0.5X and 1.0X MTBF and 52% greater than 1.0X MTBF. This additional experience will allow the program to 
develop modified MTBF estimates for up to an estimated 88% of all Crit. 1 and Crit. 2 components. This represents 
a significant increase in overall operational experience and will help reduce the uncertainty regarding MTBF 
estimates for ISS components.  
Table 1 – Operational Times Versus MTBF 
(for U.S. Criticality Level 1 & Criticality Level 2 Components) 
Accumulated Op. Time 
/ MTBF 
Fraction of 
Components Today 
Fraction of Components 
Through 2028 (est.) 
<0.1 24.8% 19.4% 
0.1 - 0.5 29.5% 11.2% 
0.5 - 1.0 29.9% 17.3% 
>1.0 15.8% 52.1% 
 
% of MTBF Estimates 
Modified 
57.9% 88.0% 
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VI. Variability in ISS MTBF Estimates 
The component reliability data collected on ISS can be used not only to update MTBF estimates but can also be 
evaluated to begin to define a distribution of updated MTBF values versus initial MTBF estimates. Because a 
significant fraction of critical ISS components have been evaluated and have had MTBF estimates modified based 
on operational experience, it is possible to evaluate how MTBF values have changed over time, in order to predict 
what the variability in MTBF may be in the future. For all components in the subject data set that have had the 
MTBF value (associated with random and induced failures only) modified, a ratio of the modified estimate to the 
initial estimate was calculated. These estimates were then statistically evaluated to determine the distribution of this 
ratio across all components. Figure 3 illustrates the results of this analysis. The data in Figure 3 is presented as a 
cumulative distribution. The horizontal axis indicates the ratio of modified MTBF values to initial values. The 
vertical axis indicates the total fraction of components that exceed that ratio.  
The results shown in Figure 3 indicate that approximately 15% of ISS components have seen a decrease in 
MTBF value (i.e. have an MTBF ratio of less than 1.0) – indicating that the reliability of the component was less 
than initially predicted. Of the components that saw a decrease in MTBF, a very small fraction of ISS components 
saw a substantial decrease; approximately 3% had an MTBF ratio of 0.25 or lower. Figure 3 also shows that 
approximately 85% of components experienced an increase in MTBF value. Of those that improved, approximately 
14% had an MTBF ratio of at least 10.0. 
The curve shown in Figure 3 is by no means an exact prediction on future variability in ISS component MTBFs. 
There is certainly no expectation that the updated MTBF values for components, derived from ISS experience, are 
fully correct and, as discussed, many of them are still based on limited operational experience. However, because the 
modified estimates are all based on some level of operational ISS experience, it is likely that the distribution across 
all relevant components of how MTBF values have changed is at least somewhat representative of the relationship 
 
Figure 3 – Change in Estimated MTBF Values (for those that have been modified) 
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between actual MTBF values and initially predicted values. The distribution represented in Figure 3 was re-derived 
for various sub-sets of the initial component data set, filtering by type of component, magnitude of the initial MTBF 
estimate, and level of accumulated operational life. In each case, the derived distribution was similar in nature to that 
shown in Figure 3. This similarity indicates that the distribution should be at least representative of the relationship 
between actual MTBF and initially predicted MTBF. 
The operational experience gained on ISS will, to some degree, allow NASA to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with MTBF values for future DSH systems. The degree to which this experience will be applicable is also somewhat 
uncertain however. The ISS was largely designed and constructed in the 1980s to 1990s. The DSH is expected to be 
designed and built in the late 2020s. It is almost certain that this 30 to 40-year difference will lead to changes in the 
design and manufacturing of systems and components. As new technologies and materials become available, there 
will be a strong desire to incorporate these capabilities into the DSH in order to improve performance, reduce mass, 
and even to improve reliability. It is also likely that components, even those that are nominally similar to ones on 
ISS, will because of vendor availability and programmatic reasons have to be acquired from different manufactures 
and different production facilities. Additionally, systems will have to be reconfigured and rearranged in order to be 
packaged in the DSH. It is unlikely that DSH systems will be housed in ISPRs (International Standard Payload 
Racks), as many are in the ISS. Rearranging systems will lead to changes in pipe and cable runs, and changes in 
thermal, power, and vibrational profiles. Finally, the environment that the spacecraft will operate in will also change 
significantly. In particular, the radiation environment of the DSH will be much different from what is experienced 
on ISS. All of these factors may contribute to further uncertainty in MTBF values and may, to some degree, reduce 
the value of the experience gained on ISS. Unfortunately, the degree that these changing conditions will impact 
MTBF values is unknown. Therefore, the actual level of uncertainty in MTBF values for the DSH is also unknown 
at this time and for the foreseeable future.  
It is possible, however, to set reasonable bounds on possible MTBF uncertainty for the DSH. The authors 
derived two cases to represent these bounds: 
 High Uncertainty Case – In the most conservative case, the assumption was made that none of the 
accumulated ISS experience will be applicable to predicting MTBF for components in the DSH.  For this 
case, the MTBF uncertainty defined in Figure 3, will be applicable to all components in the modeled DSH 
systems.  
 Low Uncertainty Case – In the most optimistic case, the assumption is made that all of the knowledge 
gained on ISS will be directly applicable to the DSH. The environmental factors that are described above 
will have only minor impacts on MTBF values and uncertainty will be reduced based on actual 
operational experience. 
The actual level of MTBF uncertainty will likely fall somewhere between these two extremes. Investigating 
these two cases therefore will at least provide a range of where the ultimate DSH system reliability may fall, when 
accounting for MTBF uncertainty. 
To explore the impacts of component MTBF uncertainty on overall DSH reliability, the authors developed a 
Monte Carlo extension to the EMAT analysis tool. In this extension, rather than executing a single run of EMAT 
utilizing fixed MTBF values, numerous runs were completed with the MTBF for each component in the DSH model 
being allowed to vary according to a predefined distribution. These updated MTBF values were used in EMAT to 
determine the resultant overall reliability as a function of spares mass for the mission for that run. This process was 
repeated over thousands of runs, with the MTBFs varying independently for each run. The data was then statistically 
evaluated over all of the Monte Carlo runs to determine the resultant levels of overall reliability that would be 
achieved with varying confidence levels. 
The entire process was repeated for different sets of spares inventories, representing different spares mass, taken 
from the deterministic data set (with no MTBF uncertainty). The data was then statistically evaluated over all of the 
Monte Carlo runs to determine the resultant level of achieved reliability as a function of spares mass at different 
levels of confidence. 
The Monte Carlo based MTBF uncertainty tool was then used to evaluate each of the two bounding cases for 
MTBF uncertainty. By selectively applying the uncertainty distribution shown in Figure 3 to different components, 
it is possible to simulate each of these cases. For the ‘High Uncertainty’ case, in which full MTBF uncertainty is 
assumed, the distribution was applied to every component, allowing the MTBF values to vary over the full range of 
the distribution. For this case, every component was sampled for every run, producing an updated “actual” MTBF 
value.  
For the ‘Low Uncertainty’ case, a similar process was followed; however, the degree of uncertainty applied to 
each component varied, based on the level of operational experience that is anticipated to be gained on ISS. The data 
for component accumulated operational time, projected through 2028, was used to scale the level of deviation in 
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MTBF. For all components that will not have achieved at least 0.5X MTBF by 2028, the full uncertainty represented 
in the distribution from Figure 3 was applied. For any component where the operational experience was greater than 
or equal to 3X, no uncertainty was applied and the initial MTBF estimate was used. For all other components, the 
distribution in Figure 3 was sampled to develop a maximum MTBF deviation for each component. That deviation 
was then scaled linearly based on level of operational experience, with the full uncertainty applied as MTBF 
approached 0.5X and the uncertainty going to zero as operational experience approached 3.0X. The Monte Carlo 
cases were then executed and processed in a manner identical to that described for the ‘High Uncertainty’ case. 
The results of the uncertainty analysis for the ‘High Uncertainty’ case are presented in Figure 4. The results for 
the ‘Low Uncertainty’ case are presented in Figure 5. For these plots, the horizontal axis, representing the Overall 
DSH System Reliability is plotted on an inverse logarithmic scale. This is done to facilitate the assessment of the 
results at high levels of reliability, similar to what will be required for actual missions. Each figure shows the initial, 
deterministic results as a solid blue line. The 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile confidence intervals are shown as 
dashed lines. These lines represent the likelihood that a certain level of reliability could be reached, given the 
uncertainty in MTBF values. 
What is immediately obvious from Figures 4 and 5 is that the epistemic uncertainty in MTBF has a major impact 
on DSH system reliability. If the two limiting cases represent a band of possible future behavior, then it is apparent 
that the overall reliability of the DSH will be significantly lower than has been predicted based on known MTBFs. 
Using the deterministic point value, with no MTBF uncertainty, the set of spares that is manifested to provide a 
0.99 DSH reliability for the Mars mission, results in 5,984kg of manifested spares. In the best-case “low 
uncertainty” case, shown in Figure 5, at a 50th percentile confidence level, the reliability remains at approximately 
0.99. However, at a 75th percentile confidence level to the reliability drops to 0.98 and at a 95th percentile confidence 
it drops to 0.92. In the worst-case “high uncertainty” case, shown in Figure 4, at a 50th percentile confidence level, 
the reliability drops to 0.91. At a 75th percentile confidence level, the reliability drops to 0.83 and at a 95th percentile 
confidence it drops as low as 0.63. 
Because the level of actual uncertainty will fall between these two bounding cases, it will be necessary to 
manifest additional spares in order to achieve an acceptable level of system reliability. The added spares that would 
be required to increase overall DSH reliability to the initially desired level would require a large mass and volume 
increase, if possible at all. Even under the “Low Uncertainty” scenario, the spares mass required to achieve the 
initially desired 0.99 reliability at 95th percentile confidence would be over 12,000kg of spares. For the “High 
Uncertainty” scenario, it would require over 17,000kg of spares to achieve similar levels of reliability and 
confidence.  
As initially discussed above, the primary reason behind the dramatic reduction in reliability due to MTBF 
uncertainty has to do with asymmetric behavior of the system and spares. Using the distribution of modified 
MTBFs, defined in Figure 3, roughly 85% of the components in the DSH will actually end up with a longer (better) 
MTBF in each Monte Carlo run. Only 15% will end with shorter MTBF values. Even among those components that 
have a worse MTBF value, only a very small portion will be significantly worse (particularly in the Low Uncertainty 
case). However, it is this very small number of critical components that drive the behavior and reliability of the 
entire system. The components that end up with improved MTBF values do not contribute much in the way of 
improving overall reliability (again, because sufficient spares have already been manifested to protect against those 
failures). For those that have significantly worse MTBFs, those failures have not been adequately protected against 
and result in much lower DSH reliability. Because of the nature of the uncertainty in MTBF, there is no way to 
know for sure which specific components will end up with lower than expected MTBFs, so a larger than desired 
number of components will need to be manifested to account for and mitigate this uncertainty. 
While at a minimum the doubling of the needed spares mass (best case) may not seem insurmountable to provide 
from DSH perspective, this only represents a fraction of the true overall exploration architecture level “cost”. To 
accommodate this increased spares mass additional pressurized mass and volume and/or conditioned external mass 
and volume will be required. This will necessitate a dramatic increase in the required transportation system 
capability needed to move this increased mass and volume round trip from Earth to Mars with an associated 
substantial increase in Earth-to-Orbit (ETO) cargo delivery capability. Finally, the uncertainty in the DSH system 
MTBFs due to random failures is not the only source of epistemic uncertainty. Other sources of epistemic 
uncertainty associated with induced failures, design and manufacturing failure rate uncertainties, and modeling 
uncertainties may contribute an equivalent amount of growth in required spares mass. The result is that it may not be 
possible to develop a DSH that has a sufficient level of reliability to support human missions to Mars, if NASA 
continues to use current approaches for maintainability. The cost in terms of both required transportation system 
performance and the cost of needed spares sufficient to keep the system functioning with a very high degree of 
reliability required for the mission most likely will be prohibitive.  
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Figure 4 – ‘High Uncertainty’ Case – Spares Mass versus DSH System Reliability 
 
Figure 5 – ‘Low Uncertainty’ Case – Spares Mass versus DSH System Reliability 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
12 
VII. Options to Improve System Reliability 
Given that manifesting tens of thousands of kilograms of spares, and the associated transportation system 
requirements, in order to achieve an acceptable level of reliability will be extremely challenging from a mission 
architecture standpoint, NASA will need to consider other options to improve overall reliability. 
Plan Probabilistically: The first option is perhaps the most obvious. Rather than selecting spares 
deterministically, assuming fixed MTBF values, planners should include the level of uncertainty in each MTBF 
value in the sparing analysis. Including uncertainty will prioritize the inclusion of spares for components that have a 
large degree on uncertainty and, as a result, contribute most heavily to reduction in probabilistic reliability. 
Consideration of Modification to Systems: As discussed, there will likely be a desire to update and improve 
ISS heritage systems for the DSH. This will be done for primarily performance and mass reasons but may also be 
done to improve the reliability itself. As modifications are made, they will, to some degree, invalidate the reliability 
experience that has been accumulated on ISS. This analysis has shown that added uncertainty has a negative impact 
on net achieved reliability. Any changes proposed to existing ISS systems that will be planned for use in future DSH 
systems or the use of totally new systems with limited operational lifetimes should be carefully considered, 
balancing the potential gain with the potential increase in uncertainty in MTBF and the resultant decrease in overall 
system reliability.  
Change the approach to maintenance and repair: The large required mass and associated volume to 
accommodate spares is largely driven by the overall approach to maintainability, which is focused on manifesting of 
spare parts to allow for repair of failed systems and components. Emerging technologies, such as in-space 
manufacturing (ISM), present other potentially attractive options for enabling a high level of supportabilityviii. If a 
fraction of required spares could be manufactured on-board the spacecraft during the mission, utilizing common 
equipment and stock, it may be possible to achieve high levels of reliability at a significantly reduced mass. ISM 
largely invalidates the issues with MTBF uncertainty, as relevant components can be manufactures on-demand as 
actual random failures occur. However, additional study is required to evaluate the applicability of technologies such 
as ISM to different DSH components and to determine the impacts of allowing in-space manufactured spares to be 
used on these systems. To fully achieve the potential value/return on investment of this type of approach, the 
following additional factor may need to be accomplished in parallel. 
Reduce System Complexity: Certain systems are incorporated into the DSH to reduce consumables mass for the 
crew. These systems, which are designed to recycle air and water, contain a significant fraction of the overall 
number of critical components. For these systems, there is an upper limit of required spares mass where it will still 
make sense to continue to include the system in a future DSH design. For example, rather than manifesting a more 
closed-loop system (e.g., water, air, waste, etc.) and all of the required spares, it will be more efficient (and likely 
less risky) to simply manifest the consumables themselves. Decisions such as these must be made in consideration 
of the inherent uncertainty in reliability. 
VIII. Conclusion & Forward Work 
The analyses executed for this paper were intended to show the impact of one specific type of epistemic 
uncertainty on overall DSH system reliability, concentrating on one critical factor – random failures as represented 
by MTBF. This is by no means a complete analysis of the uncertainties involved in reliability analysis. There are 
numerous other factors that may contribute to reliability and will also have to be evaluated and considered.  
Uncertainty in element lifetime, which define failures due to component wear-out can also be uncertain, and will 
have to be protected against. Similarly, another parameter that relates to MTBF, the K-Factor, defines the 
probability of “induced failures” in spacecraft components and systems. Similar to MTBF values, component K-
Factors are defined based on past experience and may also involve a high degree of uncertainty for deep-space 
missions.  
Finally, there is the issue of “design and manufacturer errors”. A significant fraction of failures on-board ISS 
have been attributed to “other” causes, including some number associated with deficiencies in design or manufacture 
of components. The root causes of these failures have been diagnosed and rectified, therefore from an ISS reliability 
modeling perspective they have not been included in the Bayesian analysis to update ISS MTBF values and 
subsequently do not contribute to overall probability of future failure for those ISS components. However, for a 
deep-space mission, these “other” failure drivers, including design and/or manufacturing errors, will likely also be 
an issue and will need to be accounted for and better characterized to understand their impact in the future 
exploration architecture DSH design process. Because many components will not be identical to those used and 
operated on ISS there may be new sources of design and manufacturer errors. It is unlikely that most of these errors 
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will be discovered during the limited test period anticipated for the DSH. Additional failures, beyond those predicted 
by component lifetime, MTBF, and K-Factor, may then occur during the mission, further reducing reliability. 
The analyses described in this paper demonstrate that uncertainty in reliability will be a major contributor to 
achieving a desired level of mission safety and assurance. In order to develop an overall approach to designing and 
maintaining the systems that will take humans to and from Mars and on the Martian surface, it is critical that NASA 
and others continue to evaluate data from ISS and other sources to better predict and account for uncertainty in 
reliability analysis. As part of this effort, NASA must continue to collect and analyze ISS data and should begin to 
investigate the applicability of that ISS experience to future deep space vehicles. One potential additional source of 
extremely valuable heritage information would be the inclusion of maintenance and system data from the series of 
long duration Russian human-rated spacecraft (ISS Russian Segment, Mir, and Salyut). 
Recognizing that the ability to reduce uncertainty in reliability estimates for DSVs may be limited, NASA must 
also begin to evaluate alternate strategies to maintaining and repairing future spacecraft. Consideration of reliability 
and uncertainty in system design will be critical, as will the incorporation of new technologies, such as ISM, to help 
solve maintainability issues. 
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